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The interlinking of morality, religion, and politics may not be new, but our pre-
disposition to separate them is. A central precept of Enlightenment thought is
that religion should remain in the private sphere, sequestered from the politics
of the public realm.1 For this reason, fifty years since identifying “political
Islam” as a theoretical issue, social scientists continue to puzzle over it.
Early on, the answers to the question of religious revival in modern society
were instrumentalist: people became religious to express economic frustration
or exert “agency” in the face of an oppressive system. Anthropologists then
turned to the question of understanding the political import of Islamic revival
in its own terms. For example, Saba Mahmood famously argued in The Politics
of Piety that a women’s piety movement in 1990s Egypt created new political
subjectivities through the cultivation of proper moral behavior.2 She contended
that scholars had overlooked this development because they focused on political
action within the formal world of the ballot box, replicating the Enlightenment
sequestration of ethics and belief into the moral/private sphere. In other words,
the question was not so much why religion had returned to public life, but
how we had decided it was absent in the first place. The answer to that question
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is secularism, a political project born out of the modern and colonial state. Far
from being a benign desacralization, Mahmood and likeminded anthropologists
argue that secularism “entails fundamental shifts in conceptions of self, time,
space, ethics, and morality, as well as a reorganization of social, political, and
religious life,” which in turn shapes our very analyses and categories.3
The insights of anthropologists regarding contemporary Islamic revival,
and secularism, can help us redefine political practice and thought in the pre-
modern Ottoman Empire, I believe.4 Works like the poet Nābī’s Ḫayriyye—a
book of advice to his son written in 1701 and the text at the core of this
essay—deserve as central a position in the formation of Ottoman political
thought as that which Rousseau’s Emile holds in European history. Texts like
Nābī’s were part of an immense body of morality literature, of which scholars
have only begun to scratch the surface, that emerged as part of a widespread
pietistic turn over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet, historians
have failed to see the broader political implications of this turn because, like
earlier scholars of contemporary Islamic revival, we have viewed it as
simply moralistic and religious and presumed that it belongs to a private
rather than political world.
Furthermore, the still reigning narrative of the religious revival in the early
modern Ottoman Empire, the so-called Kadizadeli movement, emerged in
tandem with social scientists’ initial explorations of the causes of the Islamic
Revival in the 1980s. In a book coincidentally also titled The Politics of
Piety, Madeline Zilfi first introduced the foundational narrative of Ottoman reli-
gious revival: in the seventeenth century, preachers professing an intolerant and
orthodox Islam found popular support among unemployed provincial scholars
and with this mandate made their way to power by beguiling the sultans.5
This upsurge of religiosity supposedly ended with the dismissal of the preach-
ers following a disastrous Ottoman campaign to conquer Vienna. In Zilfi’s
narrative, the Kadizadelis were a paroxysmal hiccup of fundamentalism, short-
lived and ultimately inconsequential. Like the social scientists who analyzed
the Iranian Revolution, she provides a functionalist reading of their turn
3 Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2016), 3.
4 The foundational essays of the anthropological critique belong to Talal Asad, as in Genealo-
gies, 200–36; and Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003). Alongside Mahmood, we can also point to Charles Hirschkind, The
Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2006); and Hussein Ali Agrama, Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the
Rule of Law in Modern Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). For an overview of
the literature on secularism, see Fenella Cannell, “The Anthropology of Secularism,” Annual
Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 85–100.
5 Madeline Zilfi, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600–
1800) (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988); and “The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism
in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 45, 4 (1986): 251–69.
596 N I R S H A F I R
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417519000185
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 194.94.134.248, on 29 Jun 2019 at 14:47:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
to religion as a means of exerting their agency in the face of economic dissat-
isfaction. Moreover, the Kadizadeli narrative pushes a relationship between
religion and politics as separate entities, in which preachers corrupt what
ought to be politics by bringing religion into the discussion.6 It is this presump-
tion that continues today and which the anthropology of Islamic revival and
secularism can help remedy.7 Along the way, such an engagement should
inspire both historians and anthropologists to imagine political regimes of
morality, concepts of “the social,” and even formations of the secular, which
emerged in the Middle East outside of the contexts of liberalism and colonial
modernity.
Today we can understand a broader “turn to piety” in Ottoman society,
well beyond the contours of the Kadizadeli movement, thanks to a new narra-
tive of religious history crafted over the past ten years.8 We know now that in
the early empire confessional identity was initially an afterthought, but over the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries both the state and its subjects increasingly
emphasized the centrality of Islamic practice and belief, as defined by Islamic
law, to imperial ideology.9 Geopolitically, imperial rivalries with the Habsburgs
and the Safavids, in particular, pushed the formation of an intensely Sunni iden-
tity while, locally, congregational mosques were set up in each town and major
neighborhood, becoming centers of urban life, but also social surveillance.10
Ottoman subjects redefined the boundaries of piety and Islamic practice
while also becoming increasingly concerned with defining and uprooting
6 Cemal Kafadar wrote the clearest exposition of the political vision of sixteenth-century pietists
like Birgivī Meḥmed, but even here there is a presumption of that pietists’ politics is ultimately an
escape or diversion from politics proper. Cemal Kafadar, “The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman
Historical Consciousness in the Post Süleymânic Era,” in Halil Inalcik and Cemal Kafadar, eds.,
Suleyman the Second and His Time (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993), 37–48; Tuşalp Atiyas, E. Ekin,
“The ‘Sunna-Minded’ Trend,” in Marinos Sariyannis, A History of Ottoman Political Thought
up to the Early Nineteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 233–78.
7 Some recent works that continue to use the Kadizadeli framework are Marc Baer, Honored by
the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008); Simeon Evstatiev, “The Qāḍīzādeli Movement and the Revival of Takfir in the
Ottoman Age,” in Camilla Adang et al., eds., Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic Per-
spective on Takfir (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 213–43; Mustapha Sheikh, Ottoman Puritanism and Its
Discontents: Ahmad al-Rumi al-Aqhisari and the Qadizadelis (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016); Cengiz Şişman, The Burden of Silence: Sabbatai Sevi and the Evolution of the Ottoman-
Turkish Dönmes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
8 Like Terzioğlu below, I expand the “turn to piety” from Baer’s original meaning inHonored by
the Glory of Islam.
9 These processes are summarized in Derin Terzioğlu, “How to Conceptualize Ottoman Sunni-
tization: A Historiographical Discussion,” Turcica 44 (2012–2013): 301–38.
10 Regarding mosques, see Gülru Necipoğlu, The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the
Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); on inter-imperial rivalry, see
Tijana Krstić, Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early
Modern Ottoman Empire (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
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heresy.11 This process—which Tijana Krstić has described as “confessionaliza-
tion,” in a borrowing from European history—cemented a tight relationship
between the public face of the empire as a Sunni polity and personal religios-
ity.12 This scholarship has reframed the pietistic turn in the Ottoman Empire
within a longer-term and deeper religious transformation, but we have yet to
examine its effects on political practice and thought. In less skilled hands,
the politics of confessionalization is limited to the state’s capacity to define
and enforce the boundaries of religion, and for this reason I choose the
broader term of “pietism” to include religious movements and changes that
operate both within and without the state. And to understand the deeper
shifts in political subjectivity that the pietistic transformation entailed we can
look to the more recent anthropology of Islamic revival.
I argue in this essay that the pietistic turn over the sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire created a new political regime of moral-
ity. It did so by insisting that all the empire’s Muslim subjects, not just the
sultan and elites, had the responsibility to be virtuous moral and political
actors. This was an important shift in Ottoman political thought, which previ-
ously aimed only at the moral reformation of the sultan, and the result was a
new political subjectivity centered on individual morality. Familial and
private life became important spaces of political authority, disciplinary
power, and private resistance and built the basis for the expanded, mass politics
of the seventeenth century. This moral revolution touched many of the currents
of Ottoman thought; pietistic reformers and jurists initiated the change, but
Sufis and bureaucrats quickly followed, each envisioning a different political
future stemming from a need to make ordinary subjects moral and political
actors.
What follows is a demonstration of the political import of the pietistic
transformation of the empire through a reinterpretation of the core political
concept of naṣīḥat. Literally meaning “advice,” the long-standing concept
and practice entailed exhorting fellow Muslims to lead moral lives. The stuff
of politics was deciding what a moral life meant, who was supposed to lead
one, and how. A ruler might exert naṣīḥat by ensuring that his subjects
behave morally, often through the standards of the sharia, but a subject
might also censure the ruler himself. Likewise, in extreme circumstances,
like those I describe below, subjects or subordinates were free to reject the
naṣīḥat completely and rebel. This particular blend of moral exhortations
and political sanctions makes naṣīḥat difficult if not impossible to translate,
11 On piety, see Katharina Anna Ivanyi, “Virtue, Piety, and the Law: A Study of BirgivīMeḥmed
Efendi’s Al-Ṭarīqa Al-Muḥammadiyya” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2012). On heresy, see
Guy Burak, “Faith, Law and Empire in the Ottoman ‘Age of Confessionalization’ (Fifteenth–Sev-
enteenth Centuries): The Case of ‘Renewal of Faith,’” Mediterranean Historical Review 28, 1
(2013): 1–23.
12 Krstić, Contested Conversions.
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but it also led Talal Asad to find in naṣīḥat (in contemporary Saudi Arabia) both
an analogue and an alternative to the Enlightenment notion of public reason and
critique, a foundation of the modern liberal society.13
Naṣīḥat also happens to be a central concept for historians in overturning
the presumption that the Ottoman Empire declined over the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.14 The genre traditionally known as the naṣīḥat-nāme,
or “advice book,” were the texts that Ottoman bureaucrats began writing in
the late sixteenth century, in which they decried the corruption and malfeasance
that had beset the empire. Initially, their complaints were read literally as objec-
tive statements of decline and corruption, but more recent interpretations have
recast these texts as ideological representations written by state functionaries
attempting to champion one political faction over another as the empire under-
went radical structural shifts. The authors of these treatises, by comparing the
current situation to an idealized golden age, often identified as the rule of
Suleyman (r. 1520–1566), suggested reforms to remedy what they believed
to be debilitating corruption and misrule.
Historians today may have misinterpreted the notion of naṣīḥat in their
search for a refutation of the narrative of Ottoman decline. Much like scholars
of contemporary Islamist movements, a general secularist bent has led us to
focus too narrowly on the overtly political dimensions of naṣīḥat, understand-
ing it as a “mirror for princes” but not as “morally corrective criticism.”15 It is
this latter meaning that has always predominated, before and after the seven-
teenth century. Meninski, in his dictionary of 1680, defines naṣīḥat as both
“conseil,” and “sermon,” whereas Naẓmīzāde’s dictionary from the same
13 Asad, Genealogies, 200–36.
14 For the initial literature, see Bernard Lewis, “Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman
Empire,” Studia Islamica 9 (1958): 111–27; Bernard Lewis, “Ottoman Observers of Ottoman
Decline,” Islamic Studies 1 (Mar. 1962): 71–87. For the response: Cornell Fleischer, Bureaucrat
and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541–1600) (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986); Pál Fodor, “State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th–
17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae
40, 2–3 (1986): 217–40; Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, “The Ottoman Nasihatname as a Discourse over
‘Morality,’” in Abdeljelil Temimi, ed., Mélanges Professeur Robert Mantran (Zaghouan: Centre
d’Etudes et de Recherces Ottomanes, Morisques, de Documentation et d’Information, 1988),
17–30; Cemal Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” Harvard Middle Eastern and
Islamic Review 4, 1–2 (1997–1998): 30–75; Douglas A. Howard, “Genre and Myth in the
Ottoman Advice for Kings Literature,” in Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman, eds., The
Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 137–66; Heather Ferguson, “Genres of Power: Constructing a Discourse of Decline in
Ottoman Nasihatname,” Osmanlı Araştırmaları 35 (2010): 81–116. A nice break from this is
found in Derin Terzioğlu, “Sunna-Minded Sufi Preachers in Service of the Ottoman State: The
Nasị̄ḥatnāme of Hasan Addressed to Murad IV,” Archivum Ottomanicum 27 (2010): 241–312.
15 Asad, Genealogies, 214. Asad was aware of the Ottomanist discourse on naṣīḥatnames, and
even read Abou-El-Haj’s work (see p. 216 f. 27), but he found little of relevance. For an example of
a traditional approach to political thought in the Ottoman Empire, see Linda T. Darling, A History of
Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: The Circle of Justice from Mesopotamia to
Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2013).
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period simply defines it as “a sermon and guidance toward good.”16 By the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, advice books known as naṣīḥatnāmes or
pendnāmes (pend being Persian for advice) had become exceptionally
popular among the empire’s inhabitants. They counseled people on how to
lead morally correct lives, but often with only distant political connection. It
is in these texts that we can see the true transformation of politics in the
Middle East. On the other hand, the texts that historians today label “naṣīḥat-
nāmes,” with their specific recommendations as to the proper structure of gov-
ernance, were only a small and perhaps even marginal part of the field of
naṣīḥat.
A moment of deep political crisis at the turn of the eighteenth century pro-
vides the best vantage point from which to observe naṣīḥat in action. In a col-
lective act of rebellion, the different classes of Istanbul gathered and took
control of the city in 1703. The imperial government in Edirne issued a final
act of “advice and exhortation (nuṣḥ u pend),” but the swelling crowd rejected
the sultan’s words of advice—his “naṣīḥatnāme”—and deposed him.17 Yet the
sultan’s naṣīḥat was not the only one on offer in the marketplace of advice. In
the preceding years, two men, one a şeyhülislam (the chief jurist) and the other
a poet, both close to the seat of imperial power in the late seventeenth century,
proffered radically different visions of naṣīḥat. In the wake of the 1703 rebel-
lion, one would be declared a heretic and have his body desecrated, while the
other went on to become one of the eighteenth century’s most popular authors.
In the fates of these two men, Feyżullah Efendi (d. 1703) and Yūsuf Nābī
(d. 1712), we can see two intertwined but distinct understandings of the rela-
tionship between religion and politics that emerged from the pietistic turn. In
1702, Feyżullah Efendi, the şeyhülislam and de facto ruler of the Ottoman
Empire, set out to reform and save the empire by restoring its moral order
through an imperial edict that called for the mass and compulsory education
in the basics of Sunni Islam of the entire population, from nomads in the coun-
tryside to merchants in the city. Echoing a well-known ḥadīth, he declared that
“naṣīḥat is religion! (al-din al-naṣīḥa),”18 and provided instructions for ensur-
ing that proper morals were taught in all schools, from the simplest children’s
schools to the most prestigious madrasas. The poet Yūsuf Nābī, on the other
hand, in 1701 penned the Ḫayriyye or Ḫayrināme, a book of advice addressed
to his eponymous seven-year old son, Ebu’l-Ḫayr. It quickly became one of the
16 The Latin terms given are “monitum, consilium, documentum, exhortatio, concio,” which are,
not coincidently, the same terms given for “vaʿẓ,” or sermon. Franciszek Meniński, Thesaurus lin-
guarum orientalium (Viennae, 1680), 5196. Naẓmīzāde Ḥüseyin, Şerḥ-i Luġāt-ı Tārīḫ-i Vaṣṣāf, vol.
2, Süleymaniye Library, Ayasofya MS 3151, f. 321a.
17 Naima Mustafa Efendi, Târih-i Naʿîmâ (Ravzatü’l-Hüseyn fî Hulâsati Ahbâri’l-Hâfikayn),
Mehmet İpşirli, ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 1870.
18 My translation of this ḥadīth is purposefully crude, but others, like Talal Asad, render it as
“religion is integrity.” Genealogies, 214–15.
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most popular books in the empire, and its position in the canon of Ottoman lit-
erature is attested by its early translation into French in the 1840s.19 In this text,
Nābī counsels his son how to lead a moral life as a man, while simultaneously
presenting a radical and systematic critique of Ottoman society that declares all
of its institutions and classes corrupt and the government illegitimate.
Most studies of Ottoman pietistic movements have focused on the discipli-
nary mechanisms the state employed to enforce confessional identity, whether
imposed from the top down, like Feyżullah’s project, or enacted in response to
the cries of those below. Nābī’s formal attack against the government allows
us to draw out the political import of naṣīḥat as moral critique, but it also
reveals the ways the pietistic turn was grounded in the cultivation of the self.20
My primary focus here will be Nābī’s oft-overlooked approach to naṣīḥat. To
elucidate its importance, I first examine the role of morality in Ottoman political
thought in the preceding centuries. I then sketch out the new vision of politics
embedded in the pietistic turn, and compare Feyżullah and Nābī’s competing
projects therein. My conclusion reflects on how this premodern Ottoman case
can contribute to our understanding of secularism in the Middle East.
M O R A L I T Y A N D GOV E R N AN C E I N T H E S I X T E E N T H C E N T U RY
Naṣīḥat was not purely a product of the early modern pietistic turn. It existed
long before as a Quranic injunction and in the words of medieval preachers and
philosophers. Nor was it limited to one genre. It flourished whenever moral and
political thought found themselves aligned, whether in traditional “mirror for
the princes” works like the Qābūsnāma or in the genre of adab (belles-lettres),
or in the especially important field of moral philosophy, akhlāq.21 What did
change was the specific alignment between morality and politics embedded
in naṣīḥat, when, around the seventeenth century, politics began to revolve
around the moral reformation not of the sultan but of everyday individuals.
19 The Ḫayriyye was actually one of the first works of Ottoman poetry translated into a Western
language. Conseils de Nabi Efendi à son fils Aboul Khair, Abel Pavet de Courteille, trans. (Paris:
Imprimerie impériale, 1857); Elias John Wilkinson Gibb and Edward Granville Browne, A History
of Ottoman Poetry 3 (London: Luzac, 1904).
20 Roger Chartier, Jacque Revel, and others first charted how the early modern privatization gave
rise to new notions of the family, civility, and the self as the state exercised greater control. A
History of Private Life: III. Passions of the Renaissance, Arthur Goldhammer, trans. (Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989). See also Lynn Hunt’s recent call to return to
explorations of the self, in Writing History in the Global Era (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2014).
21 For an overview of Ottoman traditions of political thought, see Marinos Sariyannis, A History
of Ottoman Political Thought up to the Early Nineteenth Century. Handbook of Oriental Studies
125 (Leiden: Brill, 2019). In the South Asian context, the discursive field of naṣīḥat seems to
have fallen primarily on the concept of “adab,” instead. See Barbara Daly Metcalf, ed., Moral
Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984); Muzaffar Alam, The Languages of Political Islam: India, 1200–1800 (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2004), 46–80.
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In his thorough study of political thought, Hüseyin Yılmaz has argued that
between the eleventh to sixteenth centuries a new moralistic conception of rul-
ership took hold in the Islamic world. In a post-Abbasid epoch, the mantle of
rulership could potentially fall upon any ruler rather than on a caliph who ful-
filled very specific requirements. In response to these open-ended possibilities,
the predominantly Sufi writers that Yılmaz studies aimed to “endow the ruler
with noble traits by changing his character for the better.”22 Therefore, in the
sixteenth century, “one of the central questions of political theory during the
age of Sūleymān” was how “to reform the ruler for moral and spiritual worthi-
ness of God-given rulership.”23 In other words, political theory centered not on
the construction of ideal institutions but on molding the ruler into an ideal
person. These discussions, in turn, created a set of values and expectations
of a ruler’s moral constitution that underlay all conceptions of legitimate rule
by circulating among a broader reading public.
Ensuring the moral perfection of the sultan was important because his role
was to mediate conflict between his subjects. As Cemal Kafadar explains, “in
Ottoman political thought, sultanic authority has to be the absolute arbiter of all
social conflict. The pursuit of self- or group-interest is only to be expected of
the subjects, but the ideal ruler is one who would steer the course of [the]
state in adherence to certain absolute principles above and beyond the
muddy waters of worldly interest.…”24 In the naṣīḥatnāme literature upon
which historians have traditionally focused, authors divided society into differ-
ent estates or status groups (military, scribal, clerical, etc.) and advised the
sultan on how to remedy the transgressions and usurpation of estate by individ-
uals. The calls for reform may have differed from one work to another, but the
sultan’s morality remained the overall locus for these authors in their attempts
to change society.
It is important to note, though, that in this earlier period the capacity for
human disposition to be trained and molded was not universal but rather
restricted to an elite.25 For the rest, there was the law (sharia), which operated
as a system to ensure moral behavior from those who were incapable of chang-
ing their nature. This hierarchal system underlay all the moral philosophies. As
Nāsịr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, the founder of the genre, stated in his Ethics, “Thus, some
men are good by nature, while others are good by religious legislation. The
instruction of this latter class in the Religious Law is like administering
water to a person who has a morsel stuck in his throat: if they be not disciplined
22 Hüseyin Yılmaz, Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 167.
23 Ibid., 169.
24 Kafadar, “Myth of the Golden Age,” 46.
25 For examples like differentiating between commoners (ʿawāmm) and elites (khawāṣṣ), see
Shahab Ahmed, What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2016), 368–77.
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in accordance with the Religious Law, then like that person they will surely
perish, for no stratagem is effective in reforming them.”26 The superior position
of the morally trained in regard to the law-abiding explains why this elite often
partook in acts, like wine drinking, that were strictly forbidden by the religious
law (sharia).27 It also explains why Ottoman princes until the seventeenth
century received little training in the jurisprudence of Islamic law.28
The line between elites and non-elites was difficult if not impossible to
cross. Justice was conceived as stability within the hierarchy, with each
segment of the population remaining within its position.29 The moral education
of the lower classes, who were incapable of changing their natures, was
regarded as waste of time and even dangerous. The Gulistān of Saʿdī, a medi-
eval Persian collection of parables read by nearly everyone with even the most
basic education, is replete with tales of such failures. A vizier educates a bandit
boy as his own son, teaching him all the arts and graces of elite society, only to
have the boy murder him and his sons, steal his wealth, and run off to join the
bandits again. The king quips, “How can anyone make a good sword out of bad
iron? A nobody will not become a somebody through education.”30
In this rough sketch we can see that during the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies morality literature was always present, but it focused on the figure of the
sultan as the vessel through which proper morality was to be enacted in the
society. This morality, however, was not necessarily equated with the sharia,
which was regarded primarily as a path for those beyond education. This
point is doubly important because, as Shahab Ahmed and others have observed,
law—that is the sharia—only became the primary means of being Muslim in
the modern period. Thus, the impact of the pietistic turn was two-fold. It deci-
sively changed the object of moral reform by insisting that all Muslims could
become objects of moral edification and reform, and it centered this moral edu-
cation on the sharia. Over the course of the seventeenth century a new concep-
tion of naṣīḥat, one focused on the moral responsibility of individuals, would
create political actors out of ordinary subjects in the empire.
T H E P O L I T I C A L I M P L I C AT I O N S O F T H E P I E T I S T I C T U R N
The pietistic transformation of the empire over the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries led to a greater scrutiny of ordinary subjects’ morality in all aspects
26 Nasir al-Din Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Tusi and G. M. Wickens, The Nasirean Ethics
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1964), 210.
27 I thank the late Shahab Ahmed for alerting me to Tusi’s insights. Ahmed,What Is Islam?, 57–
71; Yılmaz, Caliphate Redefined, 175.
28 Yılmaz, Caliphate Redefined, 3.
29 Nasir al-Din Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Tusi and G. M. Wickens, The Nasirean Ethics
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1964), 217.
30 Sa’di and Wheeler M. Thackston, The Gulistan (Rose Garden) of Sa’di (Bethesda: Ibex Pub-
lishers, 2008), 17.
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of life, which made the ruler the champion of this new moral order but also
subject to its rules. As noted earlier, much of the new scrutiny came from
the disciplinary state as it started to enforce confessional boundaries and
change the religious environment. Seventeenth-century writers often talked
about the need to be wary of the “hidden, internal enemies” of Islam, who
superficially resembled law-abiding Muslims but secretly harbored heretical
beliefs.31 One could root out the heretic from the faithful only by dissecting
their actions, which, more clearly than their words, revealed their true inten-
tions. This novel understanding of heresy is precisely what şeyhülislam Minḳ-
ārīzāde (d. 1678) tried to formalize legally when he argued that heresy could be
established not only, as traditionally, through the act of publicly denying the
Prophet Muhammad and God, but also through a person’s quotidian actions.32
The increased scrutiny of public morality was performed under a new
spotlight and on a new stage: the burgeoning urban centers of the Ottoman
Empire. Streets, coffeehouses, mosques, and bathhouses provided expanded
spaces in which to display the newfound wealth of those members of
Ottoman society who had wormed their way into the state. New goods like
coffee and tobacco provided a ready visual vocabulary of heresy and unbelief
and small luxuries like cheap furs and silks a space for individualization.33
These spaces of display were also spaces for public debates of these same
topics, incited by preachers, who were often called the “people of naṣīḥat.”
One typical but anonymous moralist and author, detailed in a formative
article of Derin Terzioğlu, went by the simple, telling sobriquet of Nuṣḥī,
Advice-Giver or Preacher.34
A preacher’s spoken exhortations were one obvious vector of naṣīḥat, but
written works moved just as quickly through the streets, mosques, and coffee-
houses. Given the need to define and debate which practices were heretical, it is
no surprise that morality handbooks flourished as a genre, read privately or
aloud. They quickly informed readers and listeners as to proper Islamic behav-
ior. These myriad texts, copied as full books or onto the margins or extra leaves
of manuscripts, had various generic titles: hundreds are simply known as
naṣīḥat or pend, while others were referred to as vaṣiyet (advice, commands),
31 See, for example, the early seventeenth-century heresiography of Meḥmed Emīn b. Saḍreddīn
eş-Şirvānī, Süleymaniye Library, Darülmesnevi MS 258, ff. 83ab. More detailed examples are in
Derin Terzioğlu, “Where Ilm-i Hal Meets Catechism: Islamic Manuals of Religious Instruction
in the Ottoman Empire in the Age of Confessionalization,” Past & Present 220 (2013): 79–114, 91.
32 Letter to Khayraddīn al-Ramlī, Süleymaniye Library, Reşid Efendi MS 1215 ff. 187a–92b.
33 For debates on coffee and tobacco, see Ralph Hattox, Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins
of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985);
James Grehan, “Smoking and ‘Early Modern’ Sociability: The Great Tobacco Debate in the
Ottoman Middle East (Seventeenth to Eighteenth Centuries),” American Historical Review 111,
5 (2006): 1352–77. Regarding consumption and the stimulation of the individual self, see Hunt,
Writing History, 134–43.
34 Terzioğlu, “Ilm-i Hal.”
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or ʿaḳā’id (creed), or some other combination thereof. Together, they comprised
a mass of morality literature that ranged from brief, simple poems in Turkish
denigrating tobacco smoking, to complex and heady academic discussions
on the nature of naṣīḥat.
When the morality manuals that initiated the pietistic shift in the sixteenth
century first appeared, they focused largely on ensuring that Muslims followed
basic ritual actions such as daily ablutions and prayers, and in doing so prior-
itized law as the primary approach to Islam.35 Yet, by the seventeenth century,
their scope expanded to focus on all aspects of life. Hamza Efendi, the author of
highly popular catechistic text explained that he wrote it because pietists like
the famous Birgivī Meḥmed (d. 1573) had written plenty on proper belief
and prayers, but had neglected all the other aspects of daily life, such as how
to buy and sell goods ethically.36 Another writer, Ebu’l-Beḳā el-Kefevī (d.
1684), better known today for his dictionary of philosophical and academic ter-
minology than for his moralistic works, rendered compilations of legal rulings
into easily actionable statements on topics like inheritance, childbirth, or
medical procedures.37
These morality manuals implicitly, and at times explicitly, propagated an
image of imperial governance as a hierarchical family. Obedience was owed
first to God and the prophets, then to the sultan, and after that to the preachers
and shaykhs who exhorted the masses and instructed fathers, who then disci-
plined their wives and consorts, who in turn raised the children.38 The afore-
mentioned Nusḥ̣ī, or “Advisor,” regarded the household as the key space of
instruction and societal order, in which wives and children, slaves and servants,
were to be instructed in the proper path.39 This particularly gendered vision of
imperial and domestic order went further than a simple familial metaphor and
often entailed telling listeners how they should structure their very families.40
Kefevī, mentioned earlier, proposed a vision of an ideal nuclear family by
telling men to limit themselves to only one wife and not take any others or
even a concubine. Women, in turn, needed to be kept out of crowds or any
places where they might see attractive youths.41 Much of this naṣīḥat extended
itself beyond regulating public behavior and into private thoughts and
35 See Tijana Krstic, “State and Religion, ‘Sunnitization’ and ‘Confessionalism’ in Süleyman’s
time,” in P. Fodor, ed., The Battle for Central Europe: The Siege of Szigetvar and the Death of
Suleyman the Magnificent and Nicholas Zrinyi (Leiden, Boston, Budapest: Brill and Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2019), 65–92.
36 Hamza Efendi, Risāle-i Beyʿ u Şirā, Dar al-Kutub, Majāmīʿ Turkī Ṭalʿat MS 131, f. 91b.
37 Ebu’l-Beḳā el-Kefevī, Tuḥfe-i Şāhān, Süleymaniye Library, Kasidecizade MS 249.
38 Kefevī, Tuḥfe-i Şāhān, ff. 140b–43a.
39 Terzioğlu, “Ilm-i Hal,” 98.
40 A popular yet unstudied morality manual of the sixteenth century is Adābü’l-Menāzil by
ʿAbdullatị̄f b. Durmus b. Selīm, which focuses on rulings for household members like women, chil-
dren, and slaves.
41 Kefevī, Tuḥfe-i Şāhān, f. 141b.
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conversations. In Kefevī’s vision of naṣīḥat, women had to be stopped from
consulting “skeptical old hags who knew nothing about religion and piety,”
on important matters, or even gossiping with other women about their
secrets.42 Like other providers of naṣīḥat, he even advised what types of
books were acceptable and unacceptable;43 women in particular needed to be
“kept away from reading or listening to romances and comedies.”44 Maintain-
ing order within the family became the key to maintaining order within the
empire, since only a proper family could raise proper (Muslim) political
subjects.
In this hierarchical vision of empire as family, the sultan was owed obedi-
ence but was also largely expected to be a pious exemplar himself, both cham-
pioning the religious law—sharia—and following its prescriptions. Many of
the morality and advice manuals, even when they focused on imparting moral-
ity to all of society’s members, had a section of advice aimed at the sultan. Con-
sider the work of şeyhülislam Debbāğzāde Meḥmed Efendi (r. 1687–1690). In
his rather academic treatise on naṣīḥat, which aimed to buttress the concept
with classical examples derived from ḥadīth, he advised the sultan that he
must avoid companions of poor morals, since “it is impossible to reform
your subjects while you are with the corrupted.” Doing so would be like
“trying to get the body to stand without a sound head.”45 The political failures
of the empire could be corrected only if everyone maintained a proper morality.
Minḳārī ʿAlī Ḫalīfe, a palace employee who seems to have specialized in
explaining religious matters to children and women, presented his masterwork,
The Remedy of the Faithful, to the eleven-year-old Sultan Mehmed IV.46 This
work of naṣīḥat—which proved quite popular and came with the endorsement
of the şeyhülislam, the former chief judge of Istanbul, and the sultan’s imam—
was a giant array of quotations from Arabic and Persian jurisprudential sources,
translated into Turkish, and arranged according to matters such as prayer, mar-
riage, and more. The introduction makes the clear case to the boy sultan that he
needs to depart from past princes’ ignorance and become knowledgeable in
sharia.47 This was no longer something that concerned only the masses,
because his legitimacy as a sultan rested on his personal knowledge and appli-
cation of the sharia.48
42 Ibid.
43 Terzioğlu, “Ilm-i Hal,” 96.
44 Kefevī, Tuḥfe-i Şāhān, f. 141b.
45 Debbāğzāde Meḥmed Efendi, Rashḥat al-Naṣīḥ min al-Ḥadīth al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Süleymaniye
Library, MS Ayasofya 1822, ff. 92b.
46 Şifāü’l-Mü’minīn, İstanbul Belediyesi Atatürk Kitaplığı, MS OE 5.
47 See note 28.
48 Referring to an older work of political theory, the author put forward the question directly, “To
what degree does the emperor of Islam need the sciences of the sharia?” Şifāü’l-Mü’minīn, ff. 9ab.
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The flood of naṣīḥat in the above examples may appear to be the sole pre-
rogative of reformers who argued for the primacy of the sharia, and indeed they
were most likely the swiftest stream, but naṣīḥat as correct moral action came
together from many different branches of Ottoman culture. Literati at the upper
echelons of society who wanted pearls of advice demonstrated through classi-
cal Arabic literature could turn to The Book of Distinction by Ibn Maʿn, the
former Ottoman ambassador to the Mughal Empire (and the son of the notori-
ous Druze rebel).49 Others could also look to ḤıfẓīMeḥmed’s huge compilation
The Virtues of Pious Deeds. Completed around 1677 after a grueling seven
years of work, it details over two long volumes, in the simplest Turkish, how
to lead a life of moral action. Drawing upon examples from the lives of the
prophets and quoting heavily from Muhammad’s pious companions like Abu
Hurayra, he not only guided readers through the basics of prayer but also
addressed questions of sexual preference (he came out against sleeping with
men) and family life. While this might strike us as a supposedly sharia-minded
work, based solely on jurists’ law, another picture emerges from his two surviv-
ing notebooks, which detail the many texts he read as he prepared his magnum
opus.50 He immersed himself in the work of medieval Sufi poets like Ibn Fāriḍ,
but also in treatises of notable seventeenth-century Sufi scholars such as Sivāsī,
Hüdaī, and a variety of slightly less famous ones. Many of these treatises
explained not only how to be a disciple but also offered advice, that is
naṣīḥat, to kings and Sufis alike. When we look at the works explicitly
labeled as “naṣīḥat” in his notebook, he drew on a generic advice book in
Turkish (labeled simply “pendnāme”), but also on the “naṣīḥat” of Aristotle,
Plato, and the ancient Persian king Anushirvan. These varied sources of
naṣīḥat attest to the concept’s pull among many segments of Ottoman
society and how authors drew upon different traditions of moral betterment.
The overwhelming numbers of naṣīḥatnāmes, morality guides, and cate-
chisms that proliferated in the seventeenth century were united by their empha-
sis on the cultivation of an individual morality, but they also competed for
readers’ attentions. One of the most popular was the Persian text known as
the Pendnāme (tr.) / Pandnāma (pr.) (Book of Advice), falsely attributed
to the famous thirteenth-century Persian poet Attar. First becoming popular
in the Ottoman Empire in the mid- to late sixteenth-century, it instructed its
readers, as did all the morality manuals, in how to eat, pray, and love (to use
our contemporary parlance). It is important because it inspired myriad transla-
49 Ḥusayn b. Fakhraddīn b. Korkmaz al-Maʿnī, Kitāb al-Tamyīz, Muḥammad `Adnān Bakhīt and
Nūfān al-Ḥammūd al-Sawārīh, eds. (Amman: Dar al-Shuruq, 2001), 39.
50 His wife, Fātṃa endowed his notebooks to preserve his legacy. Süleymaniye Library, Hacı
Mahmud Efendi MS 3768 f. iia, 79a; Fatih MS 5385 states on f. 309a that he spent three years pre-
paring it and completed it in 1079h.
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tions, commentaries, and additions over the next three centuries.51 In the bois-
terous market of naṣīḥat, however, the Pandnāma and its many imitators were
seen as competitors by preachers, who pursued a naṣīḥat centered on law. The
aforementioned Nuṣḥī singled out the entire genre of pendnāmes as a particu-
larly distracting menace.52 This might be because these texts developed a
model of moral and ethical behavior that drew from sources other than the reli-
gious law and targeted an audience with more Sufistic sympathies. Likewise,
they never explicitly called upon the state to enforce a moral code upon the
people through its disciplinary power. Throughout the seventeenth century
there was a constant tension between the desire to cultivate morality in the
self and have the state impose it from above.
Regardless of their approach, these advice manuals marked a departure
from the relationship between morality and rulership of earlier centuries.
They no longer focused on ensuring the sultan’s moral perfection and instead
established a moral axis that extended from the private homes of ordinary
people to the sultan’s palace, bypassing the gossiping salons of drunken
poets and bureaucrats. Moreover, in this vision, all were equally responsible
to behave ethically and be individually responsible for their moral burdens.
It dismantled the distinction between moral philosophy for the elite and the
law for the uneducated masses; sultans were now subject to the sharia, too,
while townspeople needed to scrutinize their behavior. The self-reflection
inherent in these pietistic and moralistic texts advanced an egalitarian individ-
ualization of moral and political subjectivity. In this ground Feyżullah and Nābī
planted their visions for the political reform of the empire.
F E Y ẒU L L A H ’ S N A Ṣ Ī Ḥ A T
At the height of his power, Feyżullah Efendi turned the office of şeyhülislam
(chief jurist) into a vehicle for ruling the empire in all but name. One of his
most ambitious orders, a decree that set out to rebuild the empire, was the
mass application of naṣīḥat in 1702. He ordered that every Muslim subject
of the empire, from the highest noble to the lowliest nomad, in every province,
town, and village, be drilled in the basics of Islamic practice and thought. The
endeavor was not to last, however, for a bit over a year later a revolt erupted that
resulted in the deposition of Sultan Mustafa II and the brutal death of Feyżullah.
After being tortured for days, Feyżullah was paraded through the square
51 A number of texts were labeled as the Pendnāme by the late sixteenth century, but shortly
thereafter a particular version of pseudo-Attar became canonical. The text is pseudonymous
because it seems that it was a sixteenth-century attribution to the medieval poet Attar (d. 1220).
There are hundreds if not thousands of copies of the Pendnāme extant in the former Ottoman
Empire, not to mention the twenty to thirty commentaries and translations on it. For a partial
list, see Helmut Ritter, “Fariduddin Attar IV,” Oriens 13/14 (1960–1961): 228–39.
52 See Mebāḥis ̱-i Īmān, Süleymaniye Library, Yazma Bağışlar MS 5563, f. 71b. Reference via
Terzioğlu, “Ilm-i Hal,” 96.
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backward on a draft horse as the crowd heckled him, until he was finally called
a heretic and unceremoniously beheaded. The soldiers then tied ropes to the
feet of his headless corpse and forced Greek priests in full ceremonial garb
to drag it around the city as they wafted incense and muttered the Christian
rites over the body, before finally tossing it into the river.53
How did Feyżullah climb to the peak of piety as leader of the believers,
only to fall as a debased heretic? He first entered the stage of Istanbul in
1661 as a twenty-four-year-old provincial scholar summoned by his mentor,
teacher, and future father-in-law, Vānī Meḥmed Efendi. Vānī Efendi, now
often referred to as the last of the so-called Kadizadeli preachers, met the
young scholar when he was teaching in Erzurum and brought him along
when the elder became the sultan’s personal preacher. Feyżullah’s family,
who were well-regarded Sufi shaykhs and scholars renowned for their miracles
and scholarship, had only migrated to Erzurum a few decades before from Kar-
abagh, whence they had fled the vicious sectarian persecution of the Safavids in
the early 1600s.54 Once established in Istanbul as a muderris (professor), Fey-
ẓullah quickly gained entrance to the palace as the tutor of the young princes,
the future sultans Mustafa II and Ahmed III. He became şeyhülislam for a brief
sixteen days in 1688 in the wake of the revolts that unseated Mehmed IV, but
was quickly dismissed and expelled to his hometown of Erzurum. Only when
his former pupil, Mustafa II, was enthroned was he brought back to the capital
and reinstated as şeyhülislam.55
Upon becoming şeyhülislam for a second time in 1695, he quickly moved
to consolidate his power, placing his sons in key positions, isolating the grand
vizier, and making himself the true center of the government by 1700. The
chroniclers, embedded within the palace circles, stress the extraordinary
heights of Feyżullah’s nepotism and his monopolization of all the posts and
benefits of government for his own household, a position that continues to
be reflected in understandings of the revolt as the “Edirne Incident” in scholar-
ship today.56 While that portrayal might certainly be true, the revolt of 1703
53 Anonymous History, Berlin Staatsbibliothek, MS Diez A quart. 5, ff. 42b-43a, MS Diez A
quart. 75, f. 268b; Balatlı Georg, “Balatlı Georg’a göre Edirne Vakası,” Hrand Andreasyan,
trans., İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi 11, 15 (1960): 47–64. 62; Sabra
Follett Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi: An Ottoman Şeyhülislam” (PhD diss., Princeton University,
1966), 142.
54 Feyżullah Efendi, in his autobiography, researches his own genealogy in the Ottoman
archives: Harvard University, Houghton Library MS Arab 113. Regarding his ancestors, see specif-
ically ff. 2b–5a. For a Turkish description and partial translation, see Fahri C. Derin, “Şeyhülislâm
Feyzullah Efendi’nin Nesebi Hakkında Bir Risâle,” İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih
Dergisi 14 (Eylül 1959): 97–104; Ahmed Türek and F. Çetin Derin, “Feyzullah Efendi’nin Kendi
Kalemden Hal Tercümesi (Pts. 1 and 2),” İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi 23
(Mar. 1969): 204–18, and 24 (Mar. 1970): 69–92.
55 A detailed biography is in Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi.”
56 Rifaʻat Abou-El-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics (Leiden:
Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te İstanbul, 1984); A detailed analysis of Feyżullah
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was unique in that it united the entire population of the empire against Feyżul-
lah. The spark of the armorers’ corps’ protest set fire to the city of Istanbul as
soldiers and artisans, scholars and students, merchants and riff-raff joined
together to take over the city and bring down the government. How did he
manage to alienate such a large swathe of the population? Why did Janissaries
poets, Armenian chroniclers, and foreign diplomats all refer to him as a “heretic
mufti (ḳızılbāş müfti)?” From these sources a more contentious image emerges:
heretic and infidel (ḳızılbāş, kāfir), the “son of a Shi’a (Acem ferzendi)” who
“transformed our faith and religion.”57 Claims such as these suggest that the
case against Feyżullah involved more than mere palace intrigues and addressed
his grander ambitions to transform Ottoman society.
The mass application of naṣīḥat was one of these ambitions. Feyżullah
had many others, such as a possible restructuring of Ottoman legal reasoning,
but let us focus on his usage of naṣīḥat.58 The plan seems to have been executed
in stages, applied in one area and then the next. The first order, sent around the
beginning of March of 1702, seems to have been directed at the Muslims of
Bosnia, who were perceived to be particularly impious. A month later, the
same exact orders were sent out to the ten or so provinces of greater
Albania. In these initial orders, the problem was quite explicit: people in the
towns and villages were destroying (helāk) the empire by “abandoning and
ignoring” the sharia and sunna and this necessitated a campaign of reeducation
through specially assigned teams of missionaries to “forbid the wrong and
enjoin the good.” These religious shock troops were supposed to teach the
basic catechism (ʿilm-i ḥāl) such as prayers, fasts, pilgrimages, and more to
the entire population in “villages and towns, near and far,” focusing especially
on the “semi-literate and commoners (ümmī ve ʿāmme).”59 Yet we know that
Feyżullah also believed that even the highest elites should receive such train-
ing. Upon becoming şeyhülislam in February of 1696, he officially endorsed
Efendi’s family politics is in Michael Nizri, Ottoman High Politics and the Ulema Household
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
57 For the Janisarry poem(s) on the revolt, see two partial renditions by Rıża Meḥmed in the
Vatican Library, MS Borg.turc.39, ff. 96a–99b. A particular translation is appended to Fariba Zar-
inebaf, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul: 1700–1800 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2010), 183–86. See also Mehmet Halit Bayri, “Aşık Mehmet Rıza,” Ülkü, III. Ser. 4 (1947): 8–
9, 8; “Balatlı Georg’,” 48–49, 52; Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 146.
58 This was an attempt to replace completely legal references to the ḳā̴nūn with those from the
sharia. The significance of this decision has yet to be fully investigated although the topic has been
debated for nearly a hundred years: for example, Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Polit-
ical and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 27–28; Uriel Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, V. L Ménage, ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 154–55. For the original, see Başbakanlık OsmanlıArşivi (hence-
forth BOA) A.DVNSNMH.d108: order 1251 (p. 293).
59 BOA A.DVNSMHM.d112: 551, 665 (pp. 156, 185). On the significance and translation of
ümmi, see Terzioğlu, “Ilm-i Hal,” 90–91.
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the aforementioned Minḳārī ʿAli Ḫalīfe’s book of naṣīḥat that insisted the
sultan himself should be fully literate in fiqh and sharia.60
A month later, the experiment was expanded to cover the rest of the
empire and a month after that an order specifically targeting Istanbul was dis-
patched.61 City folk and nomads (eṣḥāb-i aḫbiye), elders and schoolchildren
were to be taught and made to maintain the pillars of Islamic practice such
as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage. A madrasa graduate was assigned to live
among rural and nomadic communities to insist that they build schools and
mosques and then ensure that they were attended. This idea followed naturally
from the order’s particular attention to children’s schools and their curricula.
The rather elaborate plan obviously required a capable and willing cadre of
instructors, so the initial parts of the order called for the testing and, if neces-
sary, replacement of all preachers, professors, schoolteachers, and minders who
possessed limited or partial knowledge in these fields. Theywere told to exhort the
population to follow the right pathwithout inciting hatred (bağżā), rancor (şaḥnā),
or fanaticism (taʿaṣṣub) by employing only respectable sources—fiqh, ḥadīth,
and the like—rather than embellish tales and spurious facts. A plan of such ambi-
tion no doubt suffered in its execution across the far-flung empire. But it was
implemented nonetheless, albeit with much hesitation on the part of local com-
manders. Half a year on, the Grand Vizier Rāmī Meḥmed Paşa found himself
writing letters to a catechism teacher in Bosnia, in a not so gentle tone, request-
ing that he please implement Feyżullah’s plan of an empire-wide Islamic
education.62 Similarly, a year after the initial order, Feyżullah continued
directing the project by issuing the same order for the towns and villages at
the ends of the military roads in the Balkans, on the Crimean frontier (Özü),
and around Plovdiv and instructed his missionary teams to move on from
Bosnia and toward Belgrade and Euboea.63 Two months later the project
came to an early end when the mobs deposed the sultan and defiled Feyżullah’s
lifeless body.64
Feyżullah Efendi’s plan to guarantee the Islamic knowledge of all the
empire’s inhabitants was not without precedent or parallel. The project was
the culmination of an idea that had been circulating for decades in the advice
60 Süleymaniye Library, Hacı Mahmud Efendi MS 1565. This endorsement was then copied in
subsequent documents like Esad Efendi MS 1618.
61 A condensed translation of this order and the previous ones is in Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj, For-
mation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1991), 113–19; however, the references he provides seem incorrect.
The originals are in BOA A.DVNSMHM.d 112: 724–57 (pp. 208–10). For the Istanbul ones, see
112: 909–11 (p. 255).
62 An Anthology of Letters by RāmīMeḥmed Paşa, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, MS AF
159, ff. 5ab.
63 BOA A.DVNSMHM.d 114: 316 (p. 68), 811–14 (pp. 184–85), 861–62 (p. 199).
64 The original teachers in Bosnia may have stayed on, see the receipt in BOA IE.ML 112 10653.
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and morality manuals of others.65 He even simultaneously initiated a parallel
project of naṣīḥat for the empire’s Christians by appointing his client,
Awetikʿ, to the position of Armenian patriarch for the express purpose of instill-
ing “naṣīḥat” to combat the ‘heretical beliefs’ that Catholic missionaries were
spreading among the Armenian and Syriac populations.66 His disciplinary
project was the culmination of a century of discourse around morality that
emphasized the need for all of the empire’s subjects to be responsible moral
actors who reflected on their individual actions. Ensuring the moral certitude
of the empire, both among Muslims and non-Muslims, was seen to be the
only way to restore its grandeur and legitimize the sultan as the personal cham-
pion of the sharia. And yet, it is important to remember that this overambitious
project failed and may have been one reason for the extreme animus he faced at
the hands of the people. Perhaps his true sin was in going so far as to sideline
even the sultan and make the office of şeyhülislam the primary upholder of the
empire’s morality. Or perhaps it was his vision of naṣīḥat that the empire’s
subjects were simply unwilling to accept.
NĀ B Ī ’ S N A Ṣ Ī Ḥ A T
If Feyżullah Efendi attempted to inculcate his naṣīḥat through a campaign of
mass education, then the poet Nābī (1642–1712) whispered his naṣīḥat into
his listeners’ ears as they lay alone reading his books. It provides a radical polit-
ical vision, but one tied to a private moral transformation. His popular verse
book of naṣīḥat, which often went simply by the name of naṣīḥatnāme but
was formally titled Ḫayriyye, was one of the most popular works of Ottoman
Turkish literature ever written and its overwhelming approval ensured Nābī’s
immense stature in the following centuries.67 Rare is the manuscript library
that does not carry multiple copies of the Ḫayriyye today, with copy dates
65 Terzioğlu, “Ilm-i Hal,” 99.
66 Many thanks to Cesare Santus for sharing his forthcoming article, “The Şeyhülislam Feyzul-
lah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch Awetik: A Case of Entangled Confessionalization?,” in
Tijana Krstić and Derin Terzioğlu, eds., Entangled Confessionalizations? Dialogic Perspectives
on Community and Confession-Building Initiatives in the Ottoman Empire, 15th-18th Centuries
(Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias Press, forthcoming in 2020). The text of the order is in Ensar Köse,
“Bir Hayalin Peşinde Yüz Yıl,” Tarih Dergisi 63, 1 (2016): 41–88; the original order is in BOA,
D.PSK, 2/48, but it seems that a line is missing from when the order was copied by the scribe,
making it somewhat difficult to understand.
67 Meserret Diriöz, Eserlerine Göre Nâbı̂ (İstanbul: Fey Vakfı, 1994), 136. I have used the semi-
critical edition prepared by Mahmut Kaplan, given that the most commonly available version of
Iskender Pala is transcribed from the nineteenth-century printed version and thus it is about
twenty couplets short. Nābī, Hayriyye-i Nâbî (Inceleme-Metin), Mahmut Kaplan, ed. (Ankara:
Ataturk Kultur Merkezi, 2008); Nābī and Iskender Pala, Hayriyye. This work became canonical
to the point that it elicited famous responses such as the Luṭfiyye of Sünbülzāde Vehbī.
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for its 1660 couplets ranging from shortly after it was written to the end of the
nineteenth century.68
Nābī wrote the Ḫayriyye around 1701, the year before Feyżullah
embarked on his campaign of naṣīḥat qua mass education. At the time Nābī
was fifty-seven and his son, to whom he dedicated the manual, was seven.69
Like Feyżullah. Nābī was a provincial boy who made good in the capital,
coming from the Arabic and Turkish-speaking town of Ruha (today’s Urfa)
to become a successful poet and kātib (secretary) in Istanbul and Edirne,
where he had attached himself to the households of various grandees. The
death of his chief patron, Musạ̄ḥib Mustafa Pasha, in 1686 propelled him to
find employment as a secretary in the imperial chancellery of Mehmed IV,
but his success was short-lived since he lost the job following the deposition
of the sultan in 1688.70 Like Feyżullah, whom he personally knew,71 he was
unable to gain a foothold in the new political milieu and was forced to leave
Istanbul and work as a tax collector in Aleppo.72
While we might view this move as a simple loss of position, and it might
well have been, Nābī cast it as an act of self-made exile that allowed him to
push a radical critique of society and state. He describes his transition to
Aleppo by saying, “No longer preoccupied with estate | I’ve fallen into the
corner of solitude.”73 This “corner of solitude (künc-i ʿuzlet),” though, had a
second meaning of a “treasure (genc) of solitude,” a sentiment he repeats to
his son later on: “Don’t leave the house, for that is paradise | in the corner of
the house is the treasure of solitude.”74 It was a common enough act in his
time. ʿUzlet, or withdrawal, was frequently used by intellectuals to present a
deep critique of a society. Nābī would have known of Niyāz-i Misṛī, who for
much of the 1680s purposefully stayed in self-imposed exile on Limni Island
as he publicly circulated a private diary that decried the legitimacy of the
dynasty and issued prophetic and messianic claims, and of ʿAbd al-Ghanī
al-Nābulusī, who retreated into his house in Damascus only a few years
before Nābī in purposeful rejection of the corrupt society and government of
his time.75 All of these men, including Nābī, emerged from their exile with
68 The mass popularity of the Ḫayriyye differentiates it from similar but earlier works like
Mustafa Ali’s cantankerous poem, scribbled on the edge of a manuscript. Andreas Tietze, “The
Poet as Critique of Society, a 16-Century Ottoman Poem,” Turcica 9 (1977): 120–26, 145–60.
69 He was born in 1642, so arithmetic suggests the actual date of composition was 1699, or 1697
if one counts in hijri years, though the Kaplan has provided the date of 1701.
70 This convoluted history of patronage is reconstructed in Diriöz, Eserlerine Göre Nâbı ̂, 58–84.
71 See the letters and ḳaṣīdes that Nābī sent to Feyżullah, in Bibliotheque Nationale de France,
Suppl. Turc MS 378, ff. 184ab, 257b–58a.
72 BOA, AE.SMMD.IV 23.2592; IE.ML. 31.2991. By 1695, he seems to have actually been pro-
moted to the defterdār of Şām province: IE.EV. 31.3565.
73 Nābī, Ḫayriyye, 180.
74 Ibid., 225.
75 See the aforementioned morality manual of Ibn Maʿn, al-Tamyīz, 270–79. After being par-
doned from his exile, Niyāz-i Misṛī chose to stay on Lemnos Island for another fourteen years.
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empire-wide fame and following. ʿUzlet was the practice of espousing a biting
written critique of the public world through private reflection and withdrawal
into the self.
The critique that Nābī developed in his solitude was frighteningly clear:
the reigning institutions of Ottoman society were totally illegitimate. Yet this
is only part of his naṣīḥat. The other part, so often overlooked but inseparable,
is its moral exhortations on how to lead an ethical life within a corrupt society.76
Nābī moves between these two spaces, intertwining chapters that “forbid” an
evil trait or class of society and “enjoin” good qualities until he slowly
builds a screed damning the whole of Ottoman society.77
Nābī addressed his damning critique not to the sultan, as had been
common in Ottoman advice literature, but to his own son, Ebu’l-Ḫayr. The
choice is significant given that he would eventually declare the government
illegitimate, and a play on a common classical framing of the king addressing
his son, the prince.78 Yet, his fatherly advice was also meant to inculcate virtue
in its original Latin sense of virtus, the qualities of being a man, vir. While any
piece of advice addressed to a son may be burdened with metaphors of mascu-
linity, Nābī’s work possesses a deep sense that manhood is fragile, constantly
threatened by a myriad of immoral acts in which any misstep can transform a
man into an animal or a woman.79 Ever the poet, he plays by expounding on the
connection between morality and manhood in his very first chapter on the
importance of prayer. He stresses that no one is exempt from the obligations
of Islam, no matter what their status or qualities may be or what esoteric or phil-
osophical knowledge they possess. Not only is it doubtful whether anyone who
Derin Terzioğlu, “Sufi and Dissident in the Ottoman Empire: Niyazi-i Misri, 1618–1694” (PhD
diss., Harvard University, 1999), 144–89. ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, Takmīl al-Nuʿūt fī Luzūm
al-Buyūt (Perfecting Your Character by Staying at Home), Süleymaniye Library, Çelebi Abdullah
MS 385, ff. 357–76. This action was modeled on Ghazali’s retreat from and critique of society six-
hundred years earlier. al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 1999), 80–81,
87; Kaplan saw uzlet as a sign of weakness and political indifference rather than engagement.
Mehmed Kaplan, “Nâbi ve ‘Orta Insan’ Tipi,” Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Dergisi 11 (Aralık 1961):
25–44.
76 The large Turkish literature on Nābī casts him as either a poet or a political commentator. The
better includes: Mine Mengi,Divan Şiirinde Hikemî Tarzin Büyük Temsilcisi Nâbî (Ankara: Ataturk
Dil Kurumu, 1987); and Diriöz, Eserlerine Göre Nâbî. In the English-language literature, he has
been the topic of an initial study of eighteenth-century religious life, in Marlene Kurz, Ways to
Heaven, Gates to Hell: Fażlīzāde ʿAlī’s Struggle with the Diversity of Ottoman Islam, Bonner Islam-
studien 25 (Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2011), 249–68. Kurz casts him, without explanation, as a represen-
tative of mainstream religiosity.
77 On this notion, see Zilfi, Politics of Piety, 137–42; and Michael Cook’s Commanding Right
and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
78 The classic trope comes from theQābūsnāma, but medieval Arabic literature also includes the
framing of a father advising a son. Kaykavus ibn Iskandar, A Mirror for Princes: The Qabus Nama,
Reuben Levy, trans. (London: Cresset Press, 1951).
79 E.g., Nābī, Hayriyye, 233, 235, 269.
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abandons prayer can truly be a man but, he explains to his son, the three ges-
tures of prayer are represented in the very shape of the letters that spell out the
word “man (adam)”: Standing (أ), sitting (د), and prostrating (م).”80
Nābī expands his naṣīḥat to all aspects of life, often as ameans of criticizing
the social life of the new ruling classeswhose success is fueled by debt and greed.
Not only are silk and gold clothes frowned upon, but sumptuous garments in
general. In place of sable, the belly fur of a fox will suffice. Satins, silks, and bro-
cades are putrid; colorful clothes are unnecessary and one should wear plain
fabrics and dress like one’s peers.81 Nābī quips, “He who adorns his body
with silk | whoever sees him says, “What is this?!”82 The debts incurred to
pay for these luxuries turn the lion-hearted into women and sages into dolts.83
Almost anything can leave one penniless: luxurious clothes, alchemy, gambling,
or the quest for position. Even when giving charity there is no need for ostenta-
tion; rather than repairing a mosque or erecting a building it is better to feed the
hungry.84 More than anything, debt is the primary motor of Nābī’s analysis of
society and the foundation of his advice.85 For this reason, he constantly tells
his son to be happy with what little he has since the most humiliating thing pos-
sible is to ask another for financial help or a position.86
Much of Nābī’s critique can be understood as a reorientation of the tradi-
tional social spaces of Ottoman governance. In particular, the meclis—the
Islamic adaptation of the Greek symposium and the social foundation of intel-
lectual and political life—is kept at arm’s length.87 For this reason, Nābī
devotes a chapter each to the sins of hypocrisy, lying, gossip, and the like.88
The extreme denunciation of gossip (naḳl) in the meclis is telling because
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it would have been regarded in a
more positive light as “anecdotes (leṭā’if),” the verbal glue, detailed in the bio-
graphical dictionaries, that made the relatively limited intellectual elite cohere.
By the late seventeenth century, however, with a much larger intellectual
public, these anecdotes came to be regarded as vicious and destructive, and
the antithesis of naṣīḥat.89 Similarly, drinking and drug use, requisite for any
scholarly gathering (meclis) or banquet (bezm), are strictly forbidden. There
80 This is a borrowing from Ibn Arabi. Ibid., 186–87.
81 Ibid., 233–34.
82 Ibid., 233.
83 Ibid., 233, 235.
84 Ibid., 194, 268.
85 Nābī’s critique actually matches well with Baki Tezcan’s insights into effects of commercial-
ization in Ottoman society. Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire.
86 Nābī, Hayriyye, 214–17.
87 On the role of the meclis, see Helen Pfeifer, “Encounter after the Conquest: Scholarly Gath-
erings in 16th-Century Ottoman Damascus,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47
(2015): 219–39.
88 Nābī, Hayriyye, 217–19, 300–5.
89 See also Asad’s comments on ghība; Genealogies, 224.
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is nothing worse than being an addict, Nābī tells his son.90 Games of chance,
such as backgammon, are a trap created by Satan since they turn one into an
irresponsible addict who stays up all night while his family goes hungry.91 Par-
ticipating in themeclismight be inevitable, but wine, games, and other vices are
all good excuses with which to escape this den of gossips and hypocrites.
For Nābī, like many seventeenth-century moralists, the family had
become the new site of virtue and power. Nābī, of course, addressed his
reading public through the figure of his biological son, but there are other
signs as well. In contrast, again, to the male homosociability of the meclis,
Nābī restricts the act of intercourse to women. Sex with young boys, not to
mention men, is strictly forbidden since to have sex with a man is to waste
one’s sperm, an act that destroys life. A woman’s womb is the proper location
for this vital fluid.92 Yet, he cautions his son not to run out and marry solely for
bodily pleasure. A marriage in haste can result in a wife of poor moral quality.
Sexual needs should be sated with concubines, not boys, though even with
them one had to be selective:
A Circassian concubine will be a disaster
Abaza girls are without chastity
Russian and Austrian and Frank and Hungarian
All of them incurable traitors
Not one of them will become a Muslim
Not one will enter the state of the true faith93
By arguing that certain ethnicities could never truly be Muslim, or lacked the
proper morality, Nābī is suggesting not only that adherence to Islam is the
only true measure of virtue, but also that even slaves are integral family
members whose morality must be cultivated and monitored.
At first, Nābī’s moral exhortations seem to strike a chord with those other
more law-obsessed pietists of the seventeenth century, but what differentiates
him is that in his view naṣīḥat is an individual affair directed at oneself and
not a societal prescription to be directed at others. Not only is he open to the
intellectual and spiritual benefits of somewhat controversial pastimes like
music, chess, and gazing upon beautiful boys,94 but he insists that one
should not reproach others who do wrong. For example, he explicitly tells
his son not to rebuke those whom he finds drinking. It is best to not become
involved in their affairs in the first place. Rather than casting the first stone,
90 Nābī, Hayriyye, 233.
91 Ibid., 284.
92 Ibid., 212.
93 Ibid., 264.
94 Ibid., 213–14, 254, 285. While he is generally against games, he finds chess a useful allegory
for world affairs. Nābī’s contributions to music even earned him a place in a biographical dictionary
of the time. See Cem Behar, Şeyhülislâm’ın Müziği: 18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı/Türk Musıkisi ve Şeyhü-
lislâm Es’ad Efendi’nin Atrabü’l-Âsâr’ı (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinları, 2010), 279.
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one should inspect one’s own actions, because one is never free of sin.95 He
reinforces this advice by saying that one should never reproach someone in
public or treat another with disrespect.96 In other words, Nābī’s approach,
while part and parcel of the pietistic turn, is a far cry from the naṣīḥat of Fey-
żullah and his forbearers, who attempted to enforce the classic edict of “com-
manding right and forbidding wrong” to create a moral society.97
Nābī’s belief that one can only change oneself goes hand in hand with his
championship of ʿuzlet, a retreat from society to focus on one’s private self. He
tells his son,
Emerge not from the door of your house for months
Don’t think of leaving your manor
Take your book in hand and block your door
Lest you receive any news from beyond your gate
Read histories and tales and stories of the prophets
It gives humans a good share of virtue
Were you to preoccupy yourself with ḥadīs ̱ and tefsīr
What happy days! What a wonderful plan!
Don’t even think to speak with judges and pashas
You have no need to talk to that type
If someone wishes to enter your meclis
Try to silence them artfully98
Nābī’s resolution is to seal oneself within one’s house with one’s books
and reject the corrupt world outside.99 He even prescribes a proper way
for his son to receive his naṣīḥat, in a symposium of one, as he prepared
for bed with a candle: “Every evening, may he light a beeswax candle | so
that the smoke of sloth not enter his meclis.”100 Like his discourse on the
family, politics and morality emerged from, and ideally stayed within, the
bedroom.
Nābī’s new morality was only needed because he considered Ottoman
society and government completely corrupt. His critique, though, is not explicit
in the beginning of the Ḫayriyye. Instead, it builds slowly as he details the
various occupational paths that the son could follow, presenting a dark
mirror of other works of naṣīḥat that survey the different classes of the realm
and that culminate with the role of the king, a chapter that he omits. This
same structure becomes a means to expound on the moral bankruptcy of
95 Nābī, Hayriyye, 231.
96 Ibid., 221–28.
97 This is not a rejection of the injunction to command right and forbid wrong, of course, but a
redirection, in which he “forbids” entire segments and acts of Ottoman society, rather than correct-
ing the behavior of neighbors.
98 Nābī, Hayriyye, 244–45.
99 Ibid., 244–45.
100 Beeswax candles produce no smoke when burned. Ibid., 314.
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almost all of Ottoman society—the grandees (ʿayān),101 the holy men and
saints, the military men (pāşa), the jurists and the judges, and even the
sultan. The crippling financial cost of participating in the political system
drives anyone with ambitions of high position to take bribes and oppress the
people to recoup those costs. The suffering of the common people (ḥalḳ)
bearing the burden of this constant oppression is a frequent refrain. For this
reason, Nābī immediately tells his son to abandon dreams of attaining the posi-
tion of a grandee and be content being a middling person. “Watch out, don’t
you ever desire to be a grandee | be the most middling person, that estate is
enough for you.”102 The grandees—rapacious and greedy men who place no
value in learning—are the antithesis of Nābī’s new man, but even pashas and
judges would sacrifice the people in their quest for position.103 Those who
attempt to become pashas march straight into Hell, destroying the house of reli-
gion lest they risk not having their orders followed.104
As if the rapaciousness of the grandees and pashas were not enough, the
poor also must suffer the charlatans claiming to be saints and holy men. In a
chapter titled “On forbidding the pollution of lies and untruths,” Nābī lets
out a furious critique of charlatan shaykhs and saints living lavishly from the
meager donations of the poor. The shaykhs of the Sufi orders are incredibly
lazy and falsify dreams in order to proclaim their sanctity.105 All the accoutre-
ments of Sufism—the cloak, the beads, and so forth—are simply a means to
make money, a veil obstructing us from seeing the true saints.106 Now every
pickpocket and laborer becomes a saint, Nābī claims.107 The time of true
saints has passed, with everyone today simply a pale imitation. Rather than
search for a perfect guide, a book will do.108 The seyyids, those who claim
descent from the Prophet Muhammad, are just as bad.109 If there are true
saints in the world, they are to be found among the poor, working toward
divine union yet refusing riches.110
Nābī then shifts from a biting but general critique of the ills of society to a
more systematic mode: no matter what his natural disposition or moral lean-
ings, a pasha will be forced by the system to become a tyrant. He may at
101 In Nābī’s rendering, ʿayān often means anyone who aims for high office rather than the more
specific “provincial notables.”
102 Nābī, Hayriyye, 237; see also 268.
103 Ibid., 239–40.
104 Ibid., 270.
105 Ibid., 247.
106 Ibid., 250.
107 Ibid., 251.
108 Nābī never totally rejected Sufis, though. He took a common position of stressing the need to
combine esoteric and exoteric knowledge and appreciating the works of Ibn Arabi and Rumi. Ibid.,
202–4.
109 Ibid., 248.
110 Ibid., 253.
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first be a cultured scholar who knows well both religious and worldly affairs
and is magnanimous and pure-hearted. He may even aid the poor and be
aware of their problems and state that he does not desire riches. Yet everyone
is eventually corrupted. Fear of death, or the need to have one’s orders fol-
lowed, or the debts acquired from running a political household compel one
to become an oppressor.111 There is no way, in Nābī’s eyes, to escape this inev-
itable corruption even if one wishes to be virtuous.112
Nābī then shifts from this systematic critique to declaring the illegitimacy of
the government altogether. He first says that this massive injustice is only limited
to the Ottomans and cannot be found in the lands of the Uzbeks, Indians (read
Mughals), Christians, and Persians.113 He continually brings up topoi of injus-
tice—the lands lie fallow, the cities are turned into ruins, and brigands stalk
every path—until he finally states, “The order of the world has surely been cor-
rupted.”114 Nābī then posits a series of ideals of justice based on the following
formula: if only the law, the sharia, were present then there would be no oppres-
sion, no insecurity, no sudden dismissal, no brigandry, and no rebellion by the sub-
jects. All this would disappear if only the empire were run in accordance with the
law.115 Since Nābī has spent the preceding thousand or so lines outlining that all
these injustices do exist in plentitude and that the circle of justice has been shat-
tered, he has for all intents and purposes declared the government illegitimate.
Lest Nābī’s readers think that he is simply repeating the traditional critique
of the political/military segments of the government in an attempt to promote
the position of the religious scholars, he spends the next chapter declaring
the judges and jurists to be completely corrupt as well. Starting with a critique
of those jurists (muftis) who corrupt and adulterate the fetvas (legal opinions),
he quickly moves on to his real target: the judges. Nābī declares the judicial
system completely illegitimate due to the constant acceptance of bribes.
Those who cannot pay receive no justice. The judges spend their bribes on
tobacco (which was banned for periods) and rule on its permissibility
happily.116 He excoriates the judges and the muftis, saying it would be better
to be a highway robber than to ravage the law (sharīʿa also literally means
road) as a judge or jurist.117 He ends the chapter damning them all for
selling out the sharia.118 Even low-level bureaucrats (emīn) and charitable
foundation (vaḳif) managers become an object of Nābī’s scorn. The former
position is suitable only for the tame (ehli) who enjoy being ordered about.
111 Ibid., 271–73.
112 Ibid., 274–75.
113 Ibid., 276.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., 277.
116 Ibid., 281.
117 Ibid., 278.
118 Ibid., 282.
M O R A L R E V O L U T I O N S 619
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417519000185
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 194.94.134.248, on 29 Jun 2019 at 14:47:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
As for the latter, the pay is low and it is difficult to make a foundation success-
ful; one inevitably begins pilfering the foundation’s proceeds and damns
oneself to Hell.119 In the end, the judges and jurists are just like the pashas
and the soldiery and the rest of the corrupt society.120
By this point, it seems that no segment of society is innocent save the poor
and exploited farmer.121 The professor (muderris) seems to contribute the least
evil to the world, but that is a difficult path to follow. Echoing the complaints of
academics today, Nābī decries the lack of jobs and the need to move constantly
to new positions with family in tow so as to move up the ladder. A man might
succeed and climb the ranks, but along the way he will accumulate many
enemies and much debt. And a few months after reaching the top he is summa-
rily dismissed and sent to Rhodes where he will surely be taken prisoner by
pirates. All this for a measly forty aspers.122 One could easily believe that
Nābī’s only solution is to abandon society altogether, to return to the aforemen-
tioned ʿuzlet, as he exhorts his son to avoid the courts and divans, refuse to
speak to judges and pashas, and not to go outside.123
In a completely corrupt society, Nābī argues, one can only act morally as
an individual, not as a member of a social group. Yet there is one exception to
his dismal view. The only truly virtuous men in Nābī’s world are the senior sec-
retaries of the Imperial Chancellery, the ḫacegān-i dīvān. Only they possess the
moral qualities of Nābī’s new man, “knowledgeable, learned, and meek, cul-
tured, mild and patient,” gaining their fame honorably and well paid to
boot.124 Perhaps not surprisingly, Nābī’s protégé, Rāmī Meḥmed Paşa
(d. 1704), had just become the grand vizier, the first of many chancellors to
take up the post, and who may or may not have initiated the rebellion of
1703.125 In the absence of the sultan, and given Nābī’s biting critique of all
Ottoman institutions, Nābī may have been insinuating that these men were
the ones with the true right to rule, that they best possessed the proper moral
constitution for governing the empire.
C O N C L U S I O N
This story comes to an end in the summer of 1703 with the deposition of a
sultan and Feyżullah brutish death. Nābī, still in Aleppo, penned the following
chronogram in Persian to commemorate the revolt:
119 Ibid., 289–91.
120 Ibid., 281.
121 Ibid., 264–68.
122 Ibid., 287–88.
123 Ibid., 244.
124 Ibid., 291.
125 On his rise, see Ekin Emine Tuşalp Atiyas, “Political Literacy and the Politics of Eloquence:
Ottoman Scribal Community in the Seventeenth Century” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2013).
On his role in the rebellion, see Abou-El-Haj, 1703 Rebellion, 5.
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Following that villainous and corrupt mufti [Feyżullah]
When the people of Istanbul went mad and rebelled
I heard a line of a chronogram from the unseen
It said, “What is heard is not what was seen” (1703).126
What precisely is Nābī suggesting that we have failed to see? What is the ulti-
mate moral of this tale? I have argued over the course of this article that Fey-
żullah and Nābī’s intertwined story is more than an intriguing anecdote, but a
means of writing anew the history of political thought in the early modern
Middle East by focusing on their contending notions of naṣīḥat, or “advice.”
Naṣīḥat here is not the one commonly found in the secularized version of
Ottoman political thought, but rather a field in which political power was
expressed through the cultivation, exhortation, and enforcement of morality
upon commoners and elites alike. While there were many competing visions
of naṣīḥat on offer during the seventeenth century, they all developed from
the values and experiments of the pietistic turn that emphasized that all the
empire’s subjects had the potential and responsibility to be moral—and thus
political—actors, and to be so as individuals. In other words, these thinkers
advanced a new political subjectivity, one based on the reorganization of
politics around domesticity and private spaces. Here lies one major point of dif-
ference between Nābī’s naṣīḥat and that of Feyżullah: while the clerics
attempted to increasingly discipline and control private belief and even familial
relations, Nābī cultivated and protected these private spaces as sites of political
critique and resistance. As I stated in the introduction, we can only see this par-
ticular political regime of morality by adopting the insights of anthropologists
of Islamic revival and secularism.
Anthropologists themselves might benefit, in turn, from a historical per-
spective derived from the Ottoman Empire. In their search for new understand-
ings of Islamic revival, they logically have come to critique the very concept of
secularism, which they connect to stronger European influence in the nine-
teenth century. European influence for the anthropologists is not the desacral-
izing influence of science, as earlier modernization theorists believed,127 but
instead the transformative power of the colonial state which, the story goes,
introduced a divide between the “secular” and the “religious,” making the
former a foundation for politics and consigning the latter to private life. Talal
Asad, for example, identifies the emergence of secularism as a political
project with the introduction of European legal codes in nineteenth-century
Egypt and the relegation of the sharia to the sphere of family law, a space
from which the state could bring the individual into being as a new political
126 Nābī, Dīvān (Istanbul: Şeyh Yahya Efendi’nin Matbaası, 1292), 111.
127 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University
Press, 1964).
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actor and insert itself into modern ethics.128 While there were “formations of
the secular” throughout human history, secularism as a political project did
not exist prior to European colonialism because neither Arabic nor Turkish pos-
sessed words for “secularism” or the closely related concept of “society” until
the late nineteenth century.129
Anthropologists’ heavy focus on the past two centuries stems from their
desire to critique the latent workings of contemporary secular liberalism. In
the past few years, though, secularism and liberalism’s hold on our society
has grown more tenuous. Not only do critiques of secularism seem increasingly
extraneous, but there has now emerged an unvoiced anxiety by some that ques-
tioning secularism (and therefore politically redeeming Islamist pietism) risks
weakening democracy itself and inadvertently supporting autocratic
regimes.130 Perhaps one way to break out of this entrapping dichotomy is to
explore secularism’s multiple histories in the Middle East, to imagine it
beyond the confines of the liberal nation-state. Might there not have been
other revolutions in morality that emerged prior to colonialism but which we
have difficulty identifying given that they belonged to a culture with a different
temporality and conceptual vocabulary? We might interpret Nābī’s naṣīḥat, and
specifically his call for spaces of private belief and individual morality, as a
form of secularism that creates a “distinctive relation between state law and per-
sonal morality, such that religion became essentially a meter of (private)
belief.”131 I draw this connection not to place the Ottoman Empire on some
track to a fabled modernity, but rather to hint at ways that the politics fostered
by the pietistic turn might have expressed itself, even until today.
It happens that in the months preceding and following Feyżullah’s demise
the city of Istanbul initiated an experiment of self-rule. The crowds gathered
and took control of the city, and rejected the imperial government’s
naṣīḥat.132 They also, however, rejected Nābī’s former protégé, the grand
vizier Rāmī Meḥmed Paşa, whom the Janissaries singled out for invective
after Feyżullah.133 The city’s inhabitants instead chose to follow their own
path: “ignoring four hundred years of dynastic rule,” the city’s provisional
leader, Çalık Ahmed, “tried to cultivate in the public (ortalığı) the false
belief” that “the state should be run by mass gathering and assembly
(cumhûr-ı cemʿiyyeti ve tecemmuʿ-ı devleti).”134 Did this aborted proto-
128 Asad, Formations, 205–56.
129 Ibid., 206–8.
130 A partial, but different, critique is in Ussama Makdisi, “The Limits of Anti-Secularist Cri-
tique,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 17, 1 (2016): 77–79.
131 Asad, Formations, 205.
132 See note 17.
133 Vatican Library, MS Borg.turc.39, ff. 97b.
134 Naima Mustafa Efendi, Târîh-i Naʿîmâ, 1877.
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democratic uprising emerge from new understandings of naṣīḥat circulating in
the seventeenth century? Chroniclers like Naima, who wrote the above passage
after the new sultan, Ahmed III, had established himself, dismiss the uprising as
opportunistic anarchism and the event was eventually erased from the pages of
history. Historians today have likewise suggested that it was a foiled attempt to
establish a Janissary oligarchy.135 For the moment, we can only speculate about
the cultural origins and significance of this political experiment. Nābī himself,
though, urges us to take a second look at this forgotten revolution and under-
stand that “what is heard is not what was seen.”
Abstract: Over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries an immense body of
morality literature emerged in the Ottoman Empire as part of a widespread turn
to piety. This article draws upon the anthropology of Islamic revival and secular-
ism to reassess this literature’s importance and propose a new view of the history
of political thought in the empire. It does so through a close analysis of a funda-
mental concept of Ottoman political life: “naṣīḥat, ” or “advice.” Historians have
used “advice books” to counter the presumption that the Ottoman Empire
declined after the sixteenth century, but in doing so they have overlooked the con-
cept’s broader meaning as “morally corrective criticism.” I analyze two compet-
ing visions of naṣīḥat at the turn of the eighteenth century to reveal how the
concept was deployed to politically transform the empire by reforming its sub-
jects’ morality. One was a campaign by the chief jurist Feyżullah Efendi to
educate every Muslim in the basic tenets of Islam. The other was a wildly
popular “advice book” written by the poet Nābī to his son that both explicates
a new moral code and declares the empire’s government and institutions illegit-
imate. Both transformed politics by requiring that all subjects be responsible
moral, and therefore political, actors. The pietistic turn, I argue, turned domestic
spaces into political battlegrounds and ultimately created new, individualistic
political subjectivities. This, though, requires challenging functionalist concep-
tions of the relationship between religion and politics and the secularist inclina-
tion among historians to relegate morality to the private sphere.
Key words: confessionalization, religious history, secularism, political thought,
Ottoman Empire, naṣīḥat, Middle East, Islam, sharia
135 Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 222–24; Cemal Kafadar, “Janissaries and other Riffraff of
Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels without a Cause?” International Journal of Turkish Studies 13, 1 & 2
(2007): 113–34, 133.
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